Sources and References

• Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, sections 66–71.
• Suits, B. The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, Chapter 3.
• Suits, B. “The Elements of Sport.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 1, no. 1 (1973): 48–64.
• Llorens, M. R. “eSport Gaming: The Rise of a New Sports Practice.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11, no. 4 (2017): 464–476.
• Parry, J. “E-Sports Are Not Sports.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2019): 3–18.
• Hornby, N. Fever Pitch. London: Victor Gollancz, 1992. Chapter 1.
• Orwell, G. “The Sporting Spirit.” Tribune, 14 December 1945.
• Mumford, S. Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion. London: Routledge, 2011.
• Mumford, S. “Sport: Profound or a Waste of Time?” The Philosophers’ Magazine.
• Dixon, N. “The Ethics of Supporting Sports Teams.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2001): 149–158.
• Ryall, E. “Is Women’s Sport a Clear Case of Sexual Discrimination?” In Philosophy of Sport: Key Questions. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.
• Sailors, P. R. “Off the Beaten Path: Should Women Compete against Men?” Sport in Society 19, nos. 8–9 (2016): 1138–1149.
• Camporesi, S. “Who Is a Sportswoman?” Aeon, 2017.
• Sailors, P. R. “Transgender and Intersex Athletes and the Women’s Category in Sport.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2020): 419–431.
• Kliegman, J. “What Does a Great Trans Athlete Deserve?” Defector, 2025.
• World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). World Anti-Doping Code. Selections.
• McKeever, S. “A Moral Basis for Prohibiting Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Competitive Sport.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44, no. 2 (2017): 243–257.
• Veber, M. “The Coercion Argument against Performance-Enhancing Drugs.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41, no. 2 (2014): 267–277.
• Savulescu, J. “A Doping Manifesto.” In various publications on practical ethics.
• Savulescu, J., Foddy, B., and Clayton, M. “Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport.” British Journal of Sports Medicine 38 (2004): 666–670.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Philosophy of Sport.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sport/

Chapter 1: What Is Sport? Definitions and Family Resemblances

1.1 The Problem of Definition

What is a sport? At first glance the question seems trivial – everyone knows what a sport is. Football is a sport, chess might be, and knitting certainly is not. Yet the moment we try to state the necessary and sufficient conditions that all sports share, the task becomes surprisingly difficult. This chapter examines two landmark approaches to the definitional problem: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s scepticism about essential definitions and Bernard Suits’ ambitious attempt to provide one.

The philosophical stakes are high. If we cannot define “sport,” how do we decide which activities merit public funding, Olympic inclusion, or athletic scholarships? If we can define it, what does that definition reveal about the nature and value of these activities?

1.2 Wittgenstein and Family Resemblance

1.2.1 The Challenge to Essentialism

In sections 66–71 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein mounts one of the most influential challenges to essentialism (本质主义) – the view that every meaningful concept must have a single set of defining features shared by all instances that fall under it.

Wittgenstein chooses the concept “game” as his central example. He invites us to look at what board games, card games, ball games, the Olympic Games, and a child tossing a ball against a wall have in common. His answer is striking: nothing. There is no single feature that all games share.

Some games are competitive, others are not. Some involve skill, others rely on luck. Some are entertaining, some are gruelling. What we find when we examine different games is not a single common essence but a complicated network of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities.

1.2.2 Family Resemblance Concepts

Wittgenstein introduces the term family resemblance (家族相似性) to describe this pattern. Just as members of a family share various features – build, eye colour, temperament, gait – without any single feature being shared by every member, so too do games resemble one another through overlapping similarities.

In section 67, Wittgenstein offers a vivid analogy: spinning a thread. The strength of the thread does not reside in any single fibre running through its whole length but in the overlapping of many fibres. Likewise, the unity of the concept “game” does not depend on a single feature running through every instance but on the overlapping of many partial similarities.

1.2.3 Blurred Boundaries

In section 71, Wittgenstein asks: can we draw a sharp boundary around the concept “game”? His answer is that the concept has blurred edges (模糊边界). We do not know the exact boundaries of what counts as a game – not because we are ignorant of them, but because no such sharp boundaries exist. This does not render the concept useless; we use it perfectly well in everyday life.

1.3 Suits’ Definition of Games

1.3.1 The Grasshopper’s Challenge

Bernard Suits, in Chapter 3 of The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, directly challenges Wittgenstein’s scepticism. Suits believes that games can be defined, and he offers what has become the most discussed definition in the philosophy of sport.

1.3.2 The Four Elements of a Game

Suits identifies four essential elements that constitute game-playing:

1. The prelusory goal (游戏前目标): the specific state of affairs that players aim to achieve. In golf, for example, the prelusory goal is getting a ball into a hole; in a race, it is crossing a finish line first.

2. Lusory means (游戏手段): the means permitted by the rules for achieving the goal. In golf, you must use clubs to hit the ball; you cannot simply pick it up and place it in the hole.

3. Constitutive rules (构成性规则): rules that prohibit the use of more efficient means in favour of less efficient means. The rules of golf forbid you from carrying the ball to the hole, even though that would be the most efficient way to achieve the prelusory goal.

4. The lusory attitude (游戏态度): the voluntary acceptance of the constitutive rules just so that the activity they make possible can occur. Players accept the unnecessary obstacles precisely because those obstacles create the game.

Suits also offers a more portable formulation: playing a game is “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”

1.3.3 The Lusory Attitude in Detail

The lusory attitude is perhaps the most philosophically interesting of the four elements. It distinguishes game-playing from mere rule-following and from cases where inefficient means are imposed unwillingly. A prisoner forced to dig a ditch with a spoon is not playing a game, because she does not voluntarily accept the constraint. The lusory attitude captures the distinctive voluntary character of game-playing: players choose to make things harder for themselves, and they do so because the resulting activity – the game – is what they want to engage in.

1.4 From Games to Sports: The Elements of Sport

1.4.1 Suits’ Additional Criteria

In his article “The Elements of Sport,” Suits extends his analysis from games to sports. He argues that sports are a subset of games, but not all games are sports. For a game to qualify as a sport, it must satisfy four additional conditions:

1. It must be a game of skill (技能游戏): games of pure chance, like roulette, are not sports.
2. The skill must be physical (身体技能): chess is a game of skill, but the skill is intellectual rather than physical, so chess is not a sport.
3. The game must have a wide following (广泛的受众): a game played only by a few individuals in a backyard does not qualify as a sport.
4. The following must achieve institutional stability (制度稳定性): there must be established organisations, coaches, leagues, governing bodies, and similar institutional structures.

1.4.2 Evaluating the Definition

Suits’ definition is elegant and influential, but it faces several objections:

• The physicality requirement seems to exclude activities like darts and competitive shooting, which many people regard as sports. How much physical skill is enough?
• The institutional requirement seems to conflate a sociological fact about how activities develop with a conceptual claim about what sport is. Could there not be a sport that has not yet developed institutions?
• The wide following requirement similarly seems to confuse popularity with essence. Is a niche but clearly athletic competition not a sport simply because few people watch it?

1.4.3 Wittgenstein versus Suits

The debate between the Wittgensteinian approach and the Suitsian approach remains alive in philosophy of sport. Wittgensteinians argue that the persistent difficulty of finding counterexample-free definitions vindicates the family resemblance view. Suitsians respond that Wittgenstein never actually showed that no definition is possible – he merely observed that no obvious one presents itself. The task of philosophy is to look harder, and Suits’ definition, even if imperfect, shows that substantial progress can be made.

Chapter 2: eSports and the Boundaries of Sport

2.1 The eSports Question

The rise of eSports (电子竞技) – organised competitive video gaming – provides a vivid contemporary test case for theories of sport. Professional eSports leagues fill stadiums, attract millions of online viewers, and offer prize pools rivalling those of traditional sports. But are they really sports? This question is not merely semantic; it has implications for funding, regulation, visa classifications for professional players, and Olympic inclusion.

2.2 The Case for eSports as Sport

2.2.1 Llorens’ Argument

Mariona Rosell Llorens, in “eSport Gaming: The Rise of a New Sports Practice,” argues that eSports can be considered a genuine sport. Her case proceeds through several steps:

1. Competitive structure: eSports feature organised, rule-governed competition with clear winners and losers, mirroring the structure of traditional sports.
2. Skill and training: Professional eSports players devote thousands of hours to practice, developing reflexes, hand-eye coordination, strategic thinking, and teamwork that are comparable in dedication to traditional athletic training.
3. Institutional development: eSports have developed extensive institutional infrastructure – professional leagues such as the League of Legends Championship Series, governing bodies, coaches, analysts, and media coverage.
4. Monitoring and officiating: In eSports, since the nature of the game is digital, all performances can be accurately monitored. Professional competitions also employ referees and officials.

Llorens uses League of Legends as a case study, showing how it exemplifies all the features associated with recognised sports: structured competition, a global fan base, professionalised training, and institutional governance.

2.2.2 eSports and Suits’ Criteria

Against Suits’ definition, eSports clearly satisfy some criteria (competitive games of skill with a wide following and institutional stability) but face difficulty with the requirement that the skill be physical. Proponents argue that the fine motor skills, reaction times, and physical endurance required for competitive gaming constitute physical skill, even if they differ from gross motor activities like running or jumping.

2.3 The Case against eSports as Sport

2.3.1 Parry’s Argument

Jim Parry, in “E-Sports Are Not Sports,” mounts a systematic case against the classification of eSports as sports. His argument proceeds from a definition of sport that he takes to be uncontroversial: sport is “an institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill.”

Parry identifies six necessary elements of sport:

1. Human – not animal competitions
2. Physical – not merely cognitive, like chess
3. Skill – not mere luck or recreation like jogging
4. Contest – competitive, not solitary like mountaineering
5. Rule-governed – with formal constitutive rules
6. Institutionalised – with stable governing bodies

2.3.2 Why eSports Fail the Test

Parry argues that eSports fail on multiple counts:

• Inadequate physicality: eSports do not employ “decisive whole-body control and whole-body skills.” The fine motor skills involved in clicking a mouse and pressing keys are real, but they are not the kind of physical engagement that characterises sport.
• Mediated, not direct: In traditional sports, the human body directly acts in and on the physical world. In eSports, the player’s actions are mediated by digital technology; the meaningful action occurs on a screen, not in physical space.
• Institutional instability: Unlike traditional sports, eSports games are intellectual property owned by private corporations. These companies can change the rules, discontinue a game, or alter competitive formats at will. This places serious constraints on the kind of stable, independent governance characteristic of traditional sports institutions.
• Not conducive to whole-person development: Traditional sport, Parry argues, contributes to the development of the whole person – physical fitness, bodily awareness, and health. eSports do not make a comparable contribution to human flourishing (人的完善).

2.4 Broader Implications

The eSports debate illuminates the deeper philosophical question of whether concepts like “sport” should be understood as fixed categories with essential features or as evolving social practices whose boundaries shift over time. Wittgenstein’s family resemblance approach suggests the latter: as new activities emerge that share some but not all features with existing sports, the boundary of the concept naturally becomes contested.

Chapter 3: The Value of Sport – Why We Watch and Care

3.1 Is Sport Worth Caring About?

Billions of people worldwide devote enormous time, money, and emotional energy to sport – as participants, as fans, and as members of communities built around athletic competition. But is this devotion rationally justified? Is sport genuinely valuable, or is it, as critics sometimes charge, a trivial distraction from more important things? This chapter examines philosophical perspectives on the value of sport, both for participants and for spectators.

3.2 Orwell: Sport as War Minus the Shooting

3.2.1 The Sporting Spirit

George Orwell’s 1945 essay “The Sporting Spirit” offers one of the most famous negative assessments of sport. Writing in the wake of a controversial tour of Britain by the Soviet football club Dynamo Moscow, Orwell argues that international sport, far from promoting goodwill between nations, is inherently destructive of international relations.

3.2.2 The Nationalism Argument

Orwell’s central claim is that competitive sport, especially at the international level, inevitably activates nationalism (民族主义) in its most destructive forms. As soon as questions of prestige arise – as soon as participants and spectators identify with a nation or group and feel that losing would bring disgrace – the “most savage combative instincts are aroused.” Sport does not create friendship; it creates enmity.

3.2.3 Evaluating Orwell

Orwell’s essay is deliberately provocative and one-sided. He acknowledges that “at the village level” sport can be pleasant and harmless. His target is specifically large-scale, high-stakes competitive sport. Critics note that Orwell conflates the worst excesses of sporting nationalism with the essence of sport itself. Many spectators enjoy international competition without descending into hatred, and sport has sometimes served as a vehicle for cross-cultural understanding and reconciliation.

3.3 Hornby: Fandom as Identity

3.3.1 The Accidental Fan

Nick Hornby’s memoir Fever Pitch offers a contrasting, deeply personal account of what it means to be a sports fan. Chapter 1 describes how an eleven-year-old Hornby, in the midst of family upheaval following his parents’ separation, attended his first Arsenal match and became irrevocably attached to the club.

The match itself was unremarkable – Arsenal were a notoriously dull team – but the experience met a psychological need. Hornby found in Arsenal fandom a space where his own misery was socially acceptable, even shared. The bitter, grouchy crowd at Highbury offered a form of emotional community that he could not find elsewhere.

3.3.2 Fandom and Meaning

Hornby’s account raises philosophical questions about the role of sport in personal identity (身份认同) and belonging (归属感). His attachment to Arsenal is not rationally chosen – he did not survey all available teams and select the best one. It was contingent, accidental, shaped by circumstance. Yet it became one of the most enduring and meaningful commitments of his life.

3.4 Mumford: Sport as Profound

3.4.1 Against the Triviality Objection

Stephen Mumford, in “Sport: Profound or a Waste of Time?”, directly addresses the charge that sport is trivial. He argues that if we think of sport only in terms of its prelusory goals (游戏前目标) – getting a ball into a net, crossing a finish line – then sport does indeed seem pointless. But this misses what is truly interesting about sport.

When we think in terms of lusory goals (游戏目标) – the goals as defined by the rules of the game – we see that athletes voluntarily submit to rigid constraints and make strenuous efforts to achieve something within those constraints. The fact that millions of people are willing to do this, and that millions more are riveted by watching them, “suggests something really quite profound” about human nature and the value we place on the pursuit of excellence within self-imposed limitations.

3.4.2 Ways of Watching Sport

In “Ways of Watching Sport,” Mumford distinguishes between two ideal types of sports spectator:

• The partisan (偏执型观众): watches sport primarily through the lens of loyalty to a particular team. The partisan’s primary desire is to see their team win, and their emotional experience is shaped by whether the team is winning or losing. Aesthetic considerations are secondary.
• The purist (纯粹型观众): watches sport for its aesthetic and intellectual qualities. The purist has no irrational commitment to any particular team; they want to see excellent, beautiful, skillful play, regardless of who produces it.

Mumford argues that the purist literally sees sport differently from the partisan. The partisan sees a foul as an outrage against their team or a clever tactical move depending on who committed it; the purist sees it as a disruption of the aesthetic flow of the game. The purist’s perception, Mumford suggests, is more closely attuned to what is genuinely valuable about sport: the beauty and drama of human physical excellence.

3.5 Dixon: The Ethics of Fandom

3.5.1 The Moderate Partisan

Nicholas Dixon, in “The Ethics of Supporting Sports Teams,” tries to identify the ideal attitude for sports fans. He introduces the concept of the moderate partisan (温和偏执型), which combines the best features of both the partisan and the purist.

Dixon distinguishes three types of fan:

1. The partisan: loyal to one team, primarily interested in their victory, even at the expense of fair or beautiful play.
2. The purist: loyal to good play, willing to shift allegiance to whichever team is playing best.
3. The moderate partisan: loyal to one team but unwilling to support that team when it violates the rules or the spirit of the game. The moderate partisan wants her team to win, but only through fair and excellent play.

3.5.2 Loyalty and Its Limits

Dixon argues that loyalty to a sports team is a prima facie good (初步善) – it is an instance of the broader human capacity for particular attachments that gives life meaning. Being a fan of a specific team, like being devoted to a specific community or person, involves a kind of partiality that is not only permissible but valuable.

However, loyalty has limits. When one’s team cheats, plays dirty, or systematically violates the spirit of the game, the moderate partisan withdraws support – not permanently, but for that occasion. The moderate partisan’s loyalty is conditional on the team’s conduct remaining within the bounds of acceptable sporting behaviour.

Chapter 4: Gender Categories in Sport

4.1 Why Is Sport Sex-Segregated?

Nearly all organised competitive sports are divided into men’s and women’s categories. This division is so deeply embedded in sporting culture that it rarely receives critical scrutiny. Yet from a philosophical standpoint, sex-segregation in sport raises fundamental questions about fairness (公平), equality (平等), and discrimination (歧视). This chapter examines whether the practice is justified and what alternatives might exist.

4.2 Ryall: Is Women’s Sport Sexual Discrimination?

4.2.1 The Tannsjoe Challenge

Emily Ryall, in “Is Women’s Sport a Clear Case of Sexual Discrimination?”, takes up a provocative argument originally advanced by Torbjorn Tannsjoe: that sex-segregated sport is the last remaining bastion of socially accepted sexual discrimination. The argument runs as follows:

1. In virtually every other area of social life – employment, education, civic participation – we regard sex-based segregation as unjust discrimination.
2. Sex-segregation in sport treats men and women differently solely on the basis of sex.
3. Therefore, sex-segregation in sport is sexual discrimination.

4.2.2 Responses and Complications

Ryall examines several responses to this challenge:

• The performance gap argument: Men, on average, outperform women in most athletic events due to physiological differences (greater muscle mass, higher testosterone, larger heart and lung capacity). Sex-segregation exists to give women a fair chance to compete, not to discriminate against them. Without separate categories, women would be virtually excluded from competitive sport.
• The analogy with weight classes: Sex categories in sport are analogous to weight classes in boxing or wrestling. We do not regard weight classes as discrimination against lighter fighters; they exist to ensure fair competition. Sex categories serve a similar function.
• The social value argument: Women’s sport provides role models, inspires participation, and challenges gender stereotypes. Eliminating women’s categories would undermine these social benefits.

Ryall asks whether alternative classification systems – based on weight, height, hormonal profiles, or some combination thereof – might serve the goal of fair competition without relying on the blunt instrument of sex classification.

4.3 Sailors: Should Women Compete against Men?

4.3.1 Four Possible Answers

Pamela Sailors, in “Off the Beaten Path: Should Women Compete against Men?”, identifies four possible answers to this question:

1. No, and there is no point discussing it: Women simply cannot compete with men at the highest levels, so the question is moot.
2. No, but they should try anyway: Even if women cannot currently match men’s performances, the attempt is valuable for its own sake and for what it reveals about gender assumptions.
3. Yes, so integrate all competition: If women can compete with men, there is no reason to maintain separate categories.
4. Yes, but there are good reasons not to: Even if some women can compete with some men, maintaining separate categories serves important values.

4.3.2 Relevant Distinctions

Sailors argues that the question cannot be answered in the abstract. We need to attend to several important distinctions:

• Individual vs. team sports: The dynamics of mixed competition differ significantly between individual and team sports.
• Direct vs. indirect competition: In direct competition (e.g., tennis, boxing), athletes physically confront one another. In indirect competition (e.g., gymnastics, track and field), athletes perform separately and are compared. Mixed competition may be more feasible in indirect competitions.
• Contact vs. non-contact sports: Physical contact introduces additional considerations about safety and fairness.
• Amateur vs. professional: The stakes and justifications for sex-segregation may differ at different levels of competition.

Chapter 5: Transgender and Intersex Athletes

5.1 Beyond the Binary

The previous chapter examined whether sport should be sex-segregated at all. This chapter takes up a related but distinct question: given that sport is sex-segregated, how should we determine who belongs in which category? The question has become urgent with growing recognition that sex is not a simple binary and that transgender (跨性别) and intersex (间性) athletes do not fit neatly into the traditional male/female classification.

5.2 Camporesi: Who Is a Sportswoman?

5.2.1 The Boundary Problem

Silvia Camporesi, in “Who Is a Sportswoman?”, examines the philosophical difficulties of defining who qualifies for the women’s category in sport. The question arises most acutely in the case of athletes with differences of sex development (DSD) (性别发育差异) – conditions in which chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomical sex characteristics do not fit typical definitions of male or female.

5.2.2 The Testosterone Debate

A central issue is the role of testosterone (睾酮) in athletic performance. Sports governing bodies have increasingly relied on testosterone levels as the criterion for eligibility in the women’s category. Camporesi examines the assumptions underlying this approach:

• The causal claim: Higher testosterone levels confer significant athletic advantages (greater muscle mass, bone density, oxygen-carrying capacity).
• The fairness claim: Athletes with testosterone levels in the typical male range competing in women’s events creates unfair competition.
• The definitional claim: Testosterone levels can serve as a principled basis for distinguishing male from female athletes.

Camporesi argues that while testosterone does influence athletic performance, using it as the sole or primary criterion for sex classification raises serious ethical and scientific problems. Testosterone levels vary widely among individuals of all sexes, and the relationship between testosterone and performance is not straightforward. Moreover, requiring athletes to undergo medical interventions to lower their natural testosterone levels raises concerns about bodily autonomy (身体自主权) and medical ethics.

5.3 Sailors: Transgender and Intersex Athletes and the Women’s Category

5.3.1 Foundational Commitments

Pamela Sailors, in “Transgender and Intersex Athletes and the Women’s Category in Sport,” attempts to identify the foundational commitments underlying the most common arguments in the debate. She observes that the loudest voices tend toward extremes: one side warns that including transgender and intersex athletes will push women out of sport entirely, while the other dismisses any concerns about inclusion as transphobic.

5.3.2 Competing Values

Sailors identifies several values that are in tension in this debate:

• Inclusion (包容性): all people should have the opportunity to participate in sport.
• Fairness (公平性): competition should be structured so that outcomes reflect skill, effort, and training rather than unchosen biological characteristics.
• Safety (安全性): contact sports raise legitimate concerns about physical safety when athletes of significantly different size and strength compete.
• The purpose of women’s categories: if the women’s category exists to ensure that female athletes can compete fairly, then the criteria for inclusion must track whatever features the category is designed to equalise.

5.3.3 Beyond Extreme Positions

Sailors argues that productive progress requires moving beyond the extreme positions and engaging carefully with the empirical evidence and philosophical principles at stake. There is no simple answer, and different sports may require different policies based on the specific advantages that are relevant in each context.

5.4 Kliegman: What Does a Great Trans Athlete Deserve?

Julie Kliegman’s article “What Does a Great Trans Athlete Deserve?” brings the philosophical debate into contact with lived experience. By focusing on the experiences of specific transgender athletes, Kliegman asks what obligations we have to athletes whose identities place them at the centre of a polarised cultural debate.

The question of what trans athletes “deserve” forces us to weigh competing claims: the right to participate in sport consistent with one’s gender identity, the right of other athletes to fair competition, and the responsibility of institutions to develop policies that are both principled and humane.

Chapter 6: Performance Enhancement – The Ethics of Doping

6.1 The Doping Problem

Few issues in sports ethics generate as much controversy as performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) (运动表现增强药物). The use of banned substances by elite athletes is widespread despite decades of anti-doping enforcement, and the philosophical debate about whether PEDs should be prohibited at all remains unresolved. This chapter examines the leading arguments for and against the ban on doping.

6.2 The WADA Framework

6.2.1 The World Anti-Doping Code

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (世界反兴奋剂机构), established in 1999, administers the World Anti-Doping Code, which provides the framework for anti-doping policies across all Olympic sports. The Code maintains a Prohibited List of banned substances and methods, updated annually.

6.2.2 The Three Criteria

A substance or method may be added to the Prohibited List if it satisfies any two of the following three criteria:

1. Performance enhancement: It has the potential to enhance, or does enhance, sport performance.
2. Health risk: It represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete.
3. Spirit of sport: It violates the spirit of sport (体育精神).

The “spirit of sport” criterion has been philosophically controversial. Critics argue that it is vague and subjective – reasonable people can disagree about whether a given substance violates these values. Supporters contend that it captures something essential about why we value sport: the celebration of natural human excellence achieved through dedication and effort.

6.3 McKeever: A Moral Basis for Prohibition

6.3.1 The Fair Opportunity Argument

Sean McKeever, in “A Moral Basis for Prohibiting Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Competitive Sport,” offers a philosophical defence of the ban on PEDs. His central argument is grounded not in the concept of coercion but in the duty of sport to afford fair opportunity (公平机会) to the goods that are distinctively within sport’s sphere of control.

McKeever’s argument proceeds as follows:

1. Sport provides distinctive goods – athletic achievement, recognition, the satisfaction of competitive excellence.
2. These goods should be distributed fairly – that is, based on talent, effort, and training rather than on willingness to take drugs.
3. In a world where doping is tolerated, clean athletes face bad choices: they must either dope (against their values or health interests), lower their expectations, or quit the sport.
4. Sport has a moral obligation to structure competition so that athletes are not placed in this position.

6.3.2 The Autonomy Objection

A common objection to the anti-doping position is that banning PEDs violates athletes’ autonomy (自主权). If athletes freely choose to take drugs, knowing the risks, who are we to stop them? McKeever responds that this autonomy claim, upon closer examination, has no force. The question is not whether individual athletes may choose to enhance themselves but whether the institution of sport should permit a practice that corrupts the competitive framework for everyone.

6.4 Veber: Critiquing the Coercion Argument

6.4.1 The Coercion Argument

A popular argument against PEDs holds that if doping were permitted, athletes would be coerced (强迫) into using them. The reasoning: if your competitors are doping, you must either dope yourself or fall behind. No rational athlete would choose to compete at a disadvantage, so legalising PEDs would effectively force everyone to take them, regardless of their preferences.

6.4.2 Veber’s Critique

Michael Veber, in “The Coercion Argument against Performance-Enhancing Drugs,” raises four problems with this argument and concludes that it fails:

1. The analogy problem: Many sporting activities are dangerous but not considered coercive. A skateboarder who must learn the McTwist to compete at the highest level is not coerced into performing it; the competitive environment simply sets a standard. The same, Veber argues, could be said of PED use.
2. The choice structure: Athletes already face many “forced choices” in sport – they must train intensively, follow restrictive diets, submit to gruelling schedules. These choices are competitive pressures, not coercion.
3. The threshold problem: How much pressure constitutes coercion? Veber argues that the pressure to use PEDs, while real, does not rise to the level that justifies paternalistic intervention.
4. The consistency problem: If competitive pressure to use PEDs constitutes coercion, then competitive pressure to train excessively, risk injury, or sacrifice personal relationships should also count as coercion. But we do not typically regard these pressures as grounds for banning the activities that create them.

6.5 Savulescu: The Case for Legalisation

6.5.1 A Doping Manifesto

Julian Savulescu represents the most prominent philosophical voice in favour of legalising PEDs. In “A Doping Manifesto” and “Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport” (co-authored with Bennett Foddy and M. Clayton), Savulescu argues that the current prohibition is unjust, ineffective, and incoherent.

6.5.2 Five Core Arguments

Savulescu’s case rests on several pillars:

1. The level playing field argument: Far from undermining fairness, allowing PEDs would create a more level playing field. Currently, genetic endowment determines much of athletic success. PEDs could help compensate for genetic differences, making competition more about effort and dedication.

2. The safety argument: Prohibition drives PED use underground, where athletes take substances without medical supervision. Legalisation with regulation would be safer – doctors could monitor dosages, athletes could be open about what they are taking, and unsafe substances could be specifically targeted.

3. The enforcement failure argument: “The zero tolerance ban on doping has failed.” Despite enormous investment in anti-doping testing, PED use remains widespread. A policy that cannot be effectively enforced brings the entire regulatory system into disrepute.

4. The consistency argument: Many forms of performance enhancement are already permitted – altitude training, nutritional supplements, advanced equipment, sports psychology. The line between permitted and prohibited enhancement is arbitrary and morally incoherent.

5. The autonomy argument: Athletes are adults capable of making informed decisions about their own bodies. Prohibiting PEDs is an unjustified form of paternalism (家长主义) – the state or sporting authorities overriding individuals’ choices for their own supposed good.

6.5.3 Proposed Framework

Savulescu does not advocate a free-for-all. He proposes a regulatory framework based on two principles:

• Safety thresholds: Each substance should be assessed individually. The limit on PED use should be set based on safety considerations, comparable to the level of risk we already tolerate in elite sport (concussions in football, injuries in gymnastics, etc.).
• Physiological limits: Rather than banning substances, regulate outcomes – set maximum levels for haematocrit, testosterone, and other relevant physiological parameters, and allow athletes to reach those levels by whatever means they choose.

6.6 Evaluating the Debate

The doping debate illustrates a recurring theme in philosophy of sport: seemingly practical questions – should we ban this substance? – turn on deep philosophical commitments about the nature and purpose of sport.

The debate remains philosophically open. What is clear is that any principled position on doping requires a prior account of what sport is for – a question that connects back to the definitional issues of Chapter 1 and the value questions of Chapter 3.

Key Concepts Summary