Sources and References

The following sources inform these notes, drawn from the course readings and broader philosophical literature on war ethics, pacifism, and nonviolent action:

• Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014)
• John Boyne, The Absolutist (London: Doubleday, 2011)
• Ronald J. Glossop, Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity’s Most Pressing Problem, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1987)
• Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999)
• Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006)
• Michael N. Nagler, The Nonviolence Handbook: A Guide for Practical Action (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2014)
• Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential (Boston: Extending Horizon Books, 2005)
• Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (2008): 7–44
• Srdja Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015)
• Martin Luther King Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967)
• Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015)
• Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970)
• Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
• Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997)
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on “War,” “Pacifism,” and “Political Realism in International Relations”
• Charles P. Webel and Sofia Khaydari, “Toward a Global Ethics of Nonviolence,” Transcend Media Service (July 13, 2020)

Chapter 1: What Is War? Definitions and Philosophical Frameworks

1.1 The Nature of War as a Philosophical Problem

War (战争) is among the oldest and most persistent features of human civilization, yet it remains one of the most contested concepts in moral and political philosophy. At the most basic level, war can be defined as organized, large-scale armed conflict between political communities — typically states, but also non-state actors such as insurgent groups, liberation movements, or terrorist organizations. But this functional definition conceals deep philosophical questions: Is war a natural feature of human social life? Is it an instrument of politics that can be rationally controlled? Or is it an irrational eruption of violence that destroys the very values it claims to defend?

Ronald Glossop opens Confronting War by arguing that war is “humanity’s most pressing problem” — not merely one issue among many, but a structuring condition that distorts every other domain of human concern, from economic development to environmental protection. The philosophical study of war therefore requires us to examine not only the ethics of particular conflicts but the deeper question of why human beings organize themselves for collective killing at all.

1.2 Clausewitz and the Instrumental View

The most influential modern definition of war comes from the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who famously wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” This formula treats war as an instrument of policy (政策工具) — a rational tool wielded by states to achieve objectives that diplomacy alone cannot secure. On this view, war has a logic: it is initiated for political ends, conducted according to strategic calculations, and terminated when those ends are achieved or shown to be unattainable.

The Clausewitzian framework has been enormously influential in international relations and military strategy. It implies that war can be evaluated in terms of its effectiveness: Does it achieve its political objectives? At what cost? Are there better alternatives? But this instrumental view has also been challenged on multiple fronts. Critics argue that it sanitizes war by treating it as a rational activity when in reality it is characterized by chaos, suffering, and moral degradation. As Hedges argues in War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, the experience of war reveals dynamics — myth-making, addiction to violence, the annihilation of culture — that cannot be captured by any purely rational or instrumental account.

1.3 Glossop’s Conceptual Framework

Glossop provides a useful conceptual framework for analyzing war by distinguishing several dimensions of the problem:

1. The descriptive dimension: What are wars actually like? What are their causes, their patterns, their consequences?
2. The normative dimension: When, if ever, is war morally justified? What moral constraints apply to the conduct of war?
3. The practical dimension: What can be done to reduce the frequency and destructiveness of war? What alternatives to war exist for resolving political conflicts?

This three-fold framework maps roughly onto the structure of the philosophical debate. Political realism (政治现实主义) emphasizes the descriptive dimension, arguing that war is an inescapable feature of an anarchic international system. Just war theory (正义战争论) focuses on the normative dimension, attempting to specify the conditions under which war is morally permissible. Pacifism (和平主义) and the theory of nonviolent action (非暴力行动) challenge both realism and just war theory by arguing that violence is either intrinsically wrong or practically inferior to nonviolent alternatives.

1.4 Violence as a Concept

Before engaging with debates about war specifically, it is important to clarify the broader concept of violence (暴力). Violence can be understood narrowly as the intentional infliction of physical harm on another person, or broadly to include structural and systemic forms of harm. The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung distinguished three forms:

• Direct violence (直接暴力): Physical acts of harm — killing, assault, destruction of property.
• Structural violence (结构性暴力): Harm embedded in social structures that systematically disadvantage certain groups — poverty, discrimination, denial of access to healthcare or education.
• Cultural violence (文化暴力): The symbolic sphere (religion, ideology, language, art) that legitimizes direct and structural violence by making it appear natural or inevitable.

1.5 Three Traditions in the Ethics of War

The philosophical landscape on the ethics of war can be mapped along a spectrum with three major positions:

Political realism holds that moral categories do not meaningfully apply to international relations. States exist in an anarchic system where survival is the paramount concern, and war is a necessary instrument of statecraft. Morality is a luxury that states cannot afford in matters of security.

Just war theory occupies the middle ground, maintaining that war is sometimes morally permissible but only under strict conditions. It attempts to domesticate war by subjecting it to moral constraints, both on when war may be initiated and how it may be conducted.

Pacifism denies that war can ever be morally justified. Some pacifists ground this position in absolute moral principles (such as the sanctity of life), while others argue on pragmatic grounds that violence is always counterproductive and that nonviolent alternatives are always available and more effective.

These three positions will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters. The central philosophical challenge of this course is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each position and to consider how insights from all three can inform a more thoughtful approach to the problems of violence and political conflict.

Chapter 2: Nationalism, Myth, and the Seduction of War

2.1 Hedges and the Phenomenology of War

Chris Hedges brings a unique perspective to the study of war. As a war correspondent who covered conflicts in Central America, the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans, Hedges writes not primarily as a philosopher but as a witness. His book War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning is an extended meditation on the psychological, cultural, and quasi-religious dimensions of war — the ways in which war seduces, intoxicates, and ultimately destroys those who are drawn into its orbit.

Hedges’ central thesis is that war functions as a kind of mythic narrative (神话叙事) that provides meaning, purpose, and identity to individuals and communities. In peacetime, life can feel banal, fragmented, purposeless. War offers an escape from this condition: it provides clear enemies, heroic narratives, intense communal bonds, and a sense that one’s actions matter profoundly. This is what makes war so dangerous — not merely its destructive power, but its seductive appeal.

2.2 The Myth of War

In Chapter 1 of War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, Hedges describes the myth of war (战争神话) — the sanitized, heroic narrative that nations construct to justify and glorify armed conflict. This myth typically includes several elements:

• The noble cause: War is fought for freedom, justice, civilization, or God. The cause is presented as self-evidently righteous.
• The heroic warrior: Soldiers are depicted as brave, selfless, and morally pure. Their suffering is redemptive.
• The demonized enemy: The opposing side is dehumanized, portrayed as barbaric, evil, or subhuman.
• The clean narrative: War is presented as a coherent story with a beginning, middle, and triumphant end. The chaos, moral ambiguity, and pointless suffering of actual combat are suppressed.

Hedges argues that this myth is essential to the prosecution of war. Without it, societies would be unable to mobilize their populations for the sacrifices that war demands. The myth is propagated through state propaganda, media coverage, popular culture, and education. It is maintained by censorship, self-censorship, and the social pressure to conform to patriotic narratives.

2.3 The Plague of Nationalism

Nationalism (民族主义) is, for Hedges, the primary vehicle through which the myth of war is constructed and sustained. In Chapter 2, “The Plague of Nationalism,” he argues that nationalist ideology transforms diverse, complex societies into monolithic communities defined by their opposition to an external enemy. Nationalism creates the “we” that goes to war: a unified, morally superior collective whose very identity depends on the existence of a threatening “them.”

Hedges draws extensively on his experience covering the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the former Yugoslavia, communities that had lived together for decades were torn apart by nationalist demagogues who mobilized ethnic and religious identities for political purposes. The result was ethnic cleansing, mass atrocity, and the destruction of a multicultural society.

Michael Ignatieff’s concept of the narcissism of minor differences (微小差异的自恋) is relevant here. Drawing on Freud, Ignatieff argues that the most intense hatreds arise not between radically different groups but between groups that are very similar. It is precisely the closeness of the other that is threatening, because it undermines the sense of unique identity on which nationalist narratives depend. In the Balkans, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims shared language, culture, and history. Their differences were minor. But it was precisely these minor differences that were inflated into absolute markers of identity and grounds for genocidal violence.

2.4 The Seduction of Battle

Hedges is remarkably honest about the seductive power of war (战争的诱惑力). He acknowledges that he himself was addicted to war — drawn back again and again to conflict zones not despite the danger but because of it. War provides an intensity of experience that peacetime cannot match:

• Heightened reality: Every moment matters. The senses are sharpened. Life is experienced with an intensity that is absent in ordinary existence.
• Communal bonds: The solidarity of soldiers under fire, or of civilians enduring bombardment, creates bonds of extraordinary depth and intimacy.
• Moral clarity: In war, the world is divided into good and evil, friend and enemy. The moral ambiguities of peacetime disappear.
• Purpose and meaning: War provides a grand narrative in which individual lives acquire cosmic significance.

But Hedges insists that this seduction is ultimately destructive. The intensity of war experience is inseparable from its horror. The communal bonds of wartime are purchased at the cost of dehumanizing the enemy. The moral clarity of war is a lie that collapses on contact with the reality of combat. And the meaning that war provides is a false meaning — a narcotic that prevents individuals and societies from confronting the more difficult but more genuine sources of purpose and value.

2.5 The Destruction of Culture

Chapter 3 of Hedges’ book, “The Destruction of Culture,” examines how war systematically annihilates the cultural foundations of civilized life. War does not merely kill people and destroy buildings; it destroys the shared narratives, traditions, institutions, and social trust that make communal life possible. Libraries are burned, museums are looted, schools are closed, intellectuals are targeted. The purpose of this cultural destruction is not incidental — it is integral to the logic of war, which requires the erasure of any shared humanity between combatants.

2.6 The Hijacking and Recovery of Memory

Hedges also examines how war distorts collective memory (集体记忆). Wartime regimes systematically rewrite history to serve nationalist narratives. After war, the process of recovery requires confronting this distorted memory and reconstructing a more honest account of what happened. This is one of the most difficult tasks of post-conflict reconciliation, because communities often resist the painful truths that honest memory demands.

Chapter 3: Just War Theory — Jus ad Bellum

3.1 Historical Foundations

Just war theory (正义战争论) is the dominant tradition in Western moral and political philosophy for thinking about the ethics of armed conflict. Its roots lie in classical antiquity and early Christian theology, and it has been developed and refined over two millennia by thinkers including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, and, in the modern era, Michael Walzer and Brian Orend.

The central insight of just war theory is that war occupies a moral middle ground between two extremes. Against the realist who claims that morality has no place in international relations, the just war theorist insists that war is a human activity subject to moral evaluation. Against the pacifist who claims that war is always wrong, the just war theorist maintains that war is sometimes morally necessary — that there are evils (such as aggression, genocide, or tyranny) that can only be stopped by force.

3.2 Augustine and the Christian Just War Tradition

Saint Augustine (圣奥古斯丁, 354–430 CE) is generally regarded as the founder of the Christian just war tradition. Writing in the context of the declining Roman Empire, Augustine faced a practical problem: Christianity taught love of enemies and turning the other cheek, but the Empire was under attack from barbarian invaders. How could Christians reconcile their faith with the defense of political order?

Augustine’s answer was that war could be justified as an act of love — specifically, love for the innocent who would suffer if aggression went unchecked. The Christian soldier who takes up arms does so not out of hatred or desire for glory but out of a duty to protect the vulnerable. War, on this view, is a tragic necessity in a fallen world.

Paul Christopher, in The Ethics of War and Peace, identifies several key elements of Augustine’s just war doctrine:

• Legitimate authority (合法权威): War may only be waged by a legitimate political authority — a sovereign ruler or state. Private individuals have no right to wage war.
• Just cause (正当理由): War must be fought for a morally serious reason, paradigmatically the defense against aggression or the punishment of wrongdoing.
• Right intention (正确意图): The motive for war must be genuinely moral — the restoration of peace and justice — not the pursuit of power, wealth, or revenge.

3.3 Aquinas and the Systematization of Just War

Thomas Aquinas (托马斯·阿奎那, 1225–1274) systematized Augustine’s scattered reflections into a more rigorous framework. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas specified three conditions that must be met for a war to be just:

1. The war must be declared by a legitimate sovereign authority.
2. There must be a just cause — specifically, the enemy must have committed some fault deserving of punishment or correction.
3. The belligerents must have a right intention — they must intend to promote good or avoid evil.

Aquinas also introduced the important principle of double effect (双重效果原则), which permits actions that have both good and bad consequences, provided that the bad consequence is not intended, the good consequence is proportionate to the bad, and the bad consequence is not used as a means to achieve the good.

3.4 The Modern Jus ad Bellum Criteria

Building on this historical tradition, modern just war theory identifies six criteria that must be satisfied before a war can be considered morally justified. These criteria constitute jus ad bellum (开战正义) — the justice of going to war:

3.4.1 Just Cause

The most fundamental requirement. The paradigmatic just cause is self-defense against aggression (抵御侵略的自卫). Brian Orend identifies several recognized just causes: defense against armed aggression, recovery of territory or property wrongfully seized, and punishment of an aggressor who has refused to make reparations. In contemporary international law and ethics, intervention to prevent genocide or mass atrocity is also increasingly recognized as a just cause.

3.4.2 Legitimate Authority

War may only be declared and waged by a competent authority (合法权威) — typically a sovereign state or, in certain cases, an international organization such as the United Nations. This criterion excludes private armies, criminal organizations, and individuals from the right to wage war, though it raises difficult questions about national liberation movements and non-state actors fighting against oppressive regimes.

3.4.3 Right Intention

The belligerent must be motivated by the desire to achieve a just peace, not by ulterior motives such as territorial expansion, economic exploitation, or ethnic hatred. Right intention (正确意图) is the subjective complement to the objective criterion of just cause: even a war fought for a just cause is morally compromised if waged with the wrong intentions.

3.4.4 Proportionality

The anticipated benefits of going to war must be proportionate to the expected costs. Proportionality (比例原则) requires a sober assessment of the likely human, economic, and social costs of the conflict, weighed against the goods that the war is expected to achieve. A war that causes more harm than it prevents cannot be just, even if its cause is legitimate.

3.4.5 Last Resort

War must be a last resort (最后手段), undertaken only after all reasonable peaceful alternatives — diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, economic sanctions — have been exhausted or shown to be futile. This criterion does not require that every conceivable alternative be attempted, but it does require a genuine and good-faith effort to resolve the conflict without violence.

3.4.6 Reasonable Chance of Success

A war that has no realistic prospect of achieving its objectives cannot be justified, because it would impose suffering without any compensating benefit. The criterion of reasonable chance of success (合理的成功机会) prevents reckless or suicidal military adventures undertaken for purely symbolic purposes.

3.5 Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm

Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (1977) is the most influential modern treatment of just war theory. Walzer develops what he calls the legalist paradigm (法律主义范式), which models international society on domestic society. Just as individuals in a domestic society have rights to life and liberty that are protected by law, states in the international system have rights to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Aggression — the violation of a state’s sovereignty — is the international equivalent of murder or robbery, and self-defense against aggression is the paradigmatic just cause for war.

Walzer also identifies exceptions to the strict legalist paradigm — cases where the normal rules against intervention may be overridden. These include:

• Pre-emptive strikes against an imminent threat
• Humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide or mass atrocity
• Wars of national liberation against colonial or oppressive regimes

Each of these exceptions is controversial and has been the subject of intense debate in both philosophy and international relations.

Chapter 4: Just War Theory — Jus in Bello

4.1 From the Decision to Fight to the Conduct of War

Even when the decision to go to war is justified, the manner in which the war is conducted is subject to moral scrutiny. Jus in bello (战中正义) — the justice of conduct in war — specifies the moral constraints that apply to combatants during armed conflict. The central insight is that the justice of the cause does not grant unlimited license to the means employed. Even a just war can be fought unjustly.

4.2 The Principle of Discrimination

The most fundamental principle of jus in bello is the principle of discrimination (区分原则), also known as the principle of noncombatant immunity (非战斗人员豁免). This principle holds that combatants must distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians, and that deliberate attacks on civilians are always prohibited.

The moral basis for this principle is straightforward: civilians have not forfeited their right to life by participating in armed conflict. They are, in the language of just war theory, innocent (无辜的) — not in the sense that they are morally pure, but in the sense that they are non-threatening and non-participating. Deliberately killing them serves no legitimate military purpose and constitutes murder.

In practice, the principle of discrimination raises enormous difficulties. Modern warfare blurs the line between combatants and civilians in multiple ways:

• Total war: In industrialized warfare, entire economies are mobilized for the war effort. Factory workers producing weapons, farmers feeding soldiers, and scientists developing military technology all contribute to the war effort. Are they legitimate targets?
• Guerrilla and insurgent warfare: When combatants do not wear uniforms and mingle with civilian populations, distinguishing combatants from noncombatants becomes practically impossible.
• Aerial bombardment: The history of strategic bombing, from Dresden and Hiroshima to contemporary drone warfare, demonstrates the persistent difficulty of discriminating between military and civilian targets from the air.

4.3 Proportionality in Bello

The principle of proportionality in bello (战中比例原则) requires that the harm inflicted in a particular military operation be proportionate to the military advantage expected. Even attacks on legitimate military targets are prohibited if they would cause disproportionate civilian casualties or collateral damage. This is where the principle of double effect becomes practically important: civilian deaths may be permissible as an unintended side effect of an attack on a military target, but only if those deaths are proportionate to the military advantage gained.

4.4 Prohibited Weapons and Methods

Just war theory, reinforced by international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols), prohibits certain weapons and methods of warfare that are considered intrinsically indiscriminate or disproportionate:

• Weapons of mass destruction: Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are prohibited because they cannot be directed at specific military targets and cause indiscriminate harm.
• Torture and mistreatment of prisoners: Prisoners of war must be treated humanely. Torture, summary execution, and degrading treatment are absolutely prohibited.
• Perfidy: Using protected symbols (the Red Cross, white flag of surrender) to gain military advantage undermines the laws of war and is prohibited.
• Targeting of medical and humanitarian workers: Medical personnel, chaplains, and humanitarian workers are protected persons under international law.

4.5 The Moral Equality of Combatants

A distinctive and controversial feature of the traditional jus in bello framework is the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants (战斗人员的道德平等). This doctrine holds that soldiers on both sides of a conflict — whether fighting for a just or unjust cause — have equal moral status and are equally bound by the rules of jus in bello. A soldier fighting for an unjust cause does not forfeit his rights under the laws of war, and a soldier fighting for a just cause is not exempt from those laws.

The rationale for this doctrine is partly practical — it encourages compliance with the laws of war by guaranteeing that soldiers who fight honorably will be treated as legitimate combatants rather than criminals — and partly moral, based on the recognition that individual soldiers are typically not responsible for the political decisions that led to war.

This doctrine has been challenged by philosophers such as Jeff McMahan, who argues that soldiers fighting for an unjust cause do wrong by fighting, regardless of whether they comply with jus in bello constraints. On McMahan’s view, the moral equality of combatants is a convenient legal fiction that obscures genuine moral distinctions.

4.6 Jus post Bellum

An increasingly important addition to the just war framework is jus post bellum (战后正义) — the justice of the peace that follows war. This dimension addresses questions such as:

• What obligations does a victorious power have toward the defeated population?
• What constitutes a just peace settlement?
• How should war crimes be punished?
• What are the requirements of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction?

Brian Orend has been a leading advocate for incorporating jus post bellum into the just war tradition. He argues that a war cannot be fully just unless it leads to a just and durable peace — one that respects the rights of the defeated population, holds war criminals accountable, and addresses the root causes of the conflict.

Chapter 5: Pacifism and Non-Violence — Philosophical Foundations

5.1 Varieties of Pacifism

Pacifism (和平主义) is the view that war and violence are morally unjustifiable. But this simple definition conceals a wide range of positions. Andrew Fiala, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, distinguishes several varieties:

• Absolute pacifism (绝对和平主义): All violence is always wrong, regardless of circumstances. This position is often grounded in religious commitments (e.g., the Quaker peace testimony, the Mennonite tradition of nonresistance) or in a secular commitment to the inviolability of human life.
• Conditional pacifism (有条件的和平主义): War is presumptively wrong but might be justified in extreme circumstances (e.g., to prevent genocide). This position is close to a strict version of just war theory.
• Pragmatic pacifism (务实和平主义): Violence is rejected not because it is intrinsically wrong but because it is counterproductive. Nonviolent methods are always more effective than violent ones in the long run.
• Anti-war pacifism (反战和平主义): Modern war in particular is unjustifiable because of its indiscriminate destructiveness, but individual self-defense may be permissible.

5.2 Religious Foundations of Nonviolence

Many pacifist traditions have religious roots. The early Christian church was largely pacifist, with figures such as Tertullian and Origen arguing that Christians should not serve in the military. This changed with Constantine’s adoption of Christianity as the state religion and Augustine’s development of just war theory, but pacifist traditions persisted within Christianity, particularly among the “historic peace churches” — Quakers (贵格会), Mennonites (门诺派), and the Church of the Brethren (兄弟会).

In the Hindu tradition, the concept of ahimsa (不杀生/非暴力) — non-harm or non-injury to living beings — is a central ethical principle. Gandhi drew on ahimsa to develop his philosophy of nonviolent resistance, which he called satyagraha (坚持真理, literally “truth-force” or “soul-force”).

In Buddhism, the first precept is to refrain from taking life. Buddhist ethics emphasizes compassion for all sentient beings and the recognition that violence breeds further violence in an endless cycle.

5.3 Nagler and the Foundations of Nonviolence

Michael Nagler’s The Nonviolence Handbook provides an accessible introduction to the philosophy and practice of nonviolence. Nagler argues that nonviolence is not merely a strategy or tactic but a comprehensive worldview grounded in the recognition of the interconnectedness of all life. He distinguishes between:

• Principled nonviolence (原则性非暴力): The commitment to nonviolence as a moral absolute, rooted in the belief that all human beings possess inherent dignity that must never be violated.
• Strategic nonviolence (策略性非暴力): The use of nonviolent methods because they are more effective than violent ones in achieving political goals.

Nagler argues that both forms have value but that principled nonviolence is ultimately more powerful because it transforms not only the external political situation but also the internal character of the activists who practice it.

5.4 Webel, Khaydari, and a Global Ethics of Nonviolence

Charles Webel and Sofia Khaydari argue for a “global ethics of nonviolence” that transcends particular cultural or religious traditions. They contend that the scale of modern violence — nuclear weapons, climate destruction, systemic inequality — demands a universal commitment to nonviolent principles. Their argument draws on cosmopolitan ethics: if all human beings have equal moral worth, then no political objective can justify the systematic destruction of human life that modern war entails.

5.5 Objections to Pacifism

Pacifism faces several serious objections:

The problem of evil: What should be done when an aggressor threatens innocent people? If pacifism prohibits the use of force even in defense of the innocent, it seems to leave the vulnerable at the mercy of the powerful. Critics argue that pacifism, taken to its logical conclusion, amounts to complicity in evil.

The free-rider problem: Pacifists in democratic societies benefit from the security provided by the military forces they refuse to support. Is their position morally coherent if it depends on others being willing to use violence on their behalf?

The question of effectiveness: Can nonviolent methods really work against determined, ruthless opponents? Critics point to cases where nonviolence appeared to fail — the inability of nonviolent resistance to stop the Holocaust, for example.

Pacifists have responses to each of these objections. They argue that the “problem of evil” objection assumes that violence is effective against evil, which is precisely what pacifists deny. They point to the empirical evidence, discussed in later chapters, that nonviolent resistance is actually more effective than violence in achieving lasting political change. And they argue that the free-rider objection misunderstands their position: pacifists are not passive but actively resist injustice through nonviolent means.

Chapter 6: Conscientious Objection

6.1 The Moral Problem of Conscientious Objection

Conscientious objection (良心拒服兵役) is the refusal to participate in military service on grounds of moral, religious, or philosophical conviction. It represents one of the most concrete and personal manifestations of the philosophical debates about war and violence. The conscientious objector confronts a stark dilemma: obey the law and serve in the military, potentially participating in acts he or she considers morally abhorrent, or refuse and face legal punishment, social ostracism, and the accusation of cowardice.

The philosophical question at stake is the relationship between individual conscience and political obligation. Does the individual have a moral right — or even a moral duty — to refuse participation in war? Under what circumstances does individual moral judgment override the commands of the state?

6.2 Boyne’s The Absolutist

John Boyne’s novel The Absolutist explores these questions through the story of two young British soldiers during World War I. The novel’s central character, an absolutist (绝对主义者) — someone who refuses any participation in war, including noncombatant service — represents the most radical form of conscientious objection.

The novel illuminates several dimensions of the problem:

• Social pressure and conformity: The enormous social pressure to conform to patriotic expectations, and the courage required to resist that pressure.
• The experience of combat: How the reality of trench warfare challenges the patriotic narratives that justified the war.
• Moral integrity: What it means to maintain one’s moral convictions in the face of overwhelming social and legal coercion.
• The personal costs of conscience: The punishment, isolation, and suffering inflicted on those who refuse to participate in war.

6.3 Philosophical Justifications for Conscientious Objection

Several philosophical frameworks support the right of conscientious objection:

Natural law theory: If there is a higher moral law that transcends positive law, then individuals have a right — indeed a duty — to obey that higher law when it conflicts with the commands of the state. This is the classical basis for conscientious objection in the Christian tradition.

Kantian ethics: Kant’s categorical imperative requires that we treat persons as ends in themselves, never merely as means. If war requires treating enemy combatants and civilians as mere means to political ends, then participation in war may violate the categorical imperative.

Liberal political theory: The liberal tradition, from Locke to Rawls, holds that political obligation is conditional on the state’s respect for individual rights, including freedom of conscience. If the state demands participation in activities that violate an individual’s deepest moral convictions, the individual’s right of conscience takes precedence.

Virtue ethics: From a virtue-ethical perspective, the conscientious objector may be exercising the virtues of courage, integrity, and justice — the courage to resist social pressure, the integrity to act on one’s convictions, and the commitment to justice that refuses to participate in unjust violence.

6.4 Selective Conscientious Objection

An important distinction exists between universal conscientious objection (普遍良心拒绝) — the rejection of all war — and selective conscientious objection (选择性良心拒绝) — the refusal to participate in a particular war judged to be unjust. The latter is more philosophically demanding because it requires the individual to make a specific moral judgment about the justice of a particular conflict, rather than adopting a blanket prohibition on violence.

Walzer argues that selective conscientious objection should be recognized as a moral right, because just war theory itself implies that individuals have a moral obligation not to fight in unjust wars. If wars can be just or unjust, and if individuals have moral duties that extend beyond obedience to the state, then individuals must have the right to refuse participation in wars they judge to be unjust.

Chapter 7: The Culture of War and Its Destruction

7.1 War and Cultural Identity

War transforms culture profoundly, both during and after conflict. As Hedges argues, war does not merely destroy physical infrastructure; it attacks the symbolic and institutional foundations of communal life. This chapter examines the relationship between war and culture from multiple perspectives.

The culture of militarism (军国主义文化): Many societies develop cultural formations that glorify military values — discipline, sacrifice, obedience, heroism — and treat them as the highest expressions of civic virtue. This culture of militarism shapes education, popular entertainment, public ceremonies, and political rhetoric. It creates a social environment in which war is normalized and even celebrated.

Cultural destruction in wartime: The deliberate targeting of cultural heritage — libraries, museums, religious sites, monuments — is a recurrent feature of armed conflict. This destruction is not merely collateral damage; it is often a deliberate strategy aimed at erasing the cultural identity of the enemy. The destruction of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, which held irreplaceable manuscripts documenting centuries of multicultural life in Sarajevo, is a paradigmatic example.

7.2 The Legacies of Conflict: Bosnia Herzegovina

The course includes a special focus on Bosnia Herzegovina as a case study in the legacies of conflict. The Bosnian War (1992–1995) illustrates many of the themes addressed throughout the course:

• The role of nationalist mythology in precipitating conflict
• The deliberate destruction of multicultural identity
• The challenges of post-conflict reconciliation
• The question of whether nonviolent resistance could have prevented the conflict

7.3 Memory, Narrative, and Post-Conflict Society

Hedges argues in Chapter 5, “The Hijacking and Recovery of Memory,” that wartime regimes systematically distort collective memory. Historical narratives are rewritten to serve nationalist purposes: past coexistence is denied, grievances are amplified, and a mythology of eternal victimhood is constructed. The recovery of memory after conflict requires confronting these distortions and constructing a more honest account of the past.

Geraldine Brooks’ account of the Sarajevo Haggadah — a medieval Jewish manuscript that survived both the Nazi era and the Bosnian War through acts of extraordinary individual courage — illustrates the role of cultural objects in preserving memory and resisting the destruction of shared heritage.

7.4 War and the Media

The relationship between war and media is crucial to understanding how the culture of war is maintained and challenged. Hedges, drawing on his own experience as a war correspondent, argues that the media typically serves the interests of wartime propaganda rather than providing honest reporting. Journalists face intense pressure to conform to patriotic narratives, and those who challenge those narratives are marginalized or punished.

At the same time, media can play a crucial role in exposing the reality of war and challenging the myth. The photographs from Abu Ghraib, the reporting from Vietnam that turned American public opinion against the war, and the work of independent journalists in conflict zones all demonstrate the potential of media to disrupt the culture of war.

Chapter 8: Eros, Thanatos, and the Meaning of War

8.1 The Psychological Dimensions of War

Hedges titles Chapter 7 of War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning “Eros and Thanatos,” invoking Freud’s categories of the life drive and the death drive. This chapter examines the deepest psychological and existential dimensions of the human relationship to war.

Thanatos (死亡驱力) — the death drive — represents the destructive impulse that Freud believed was a fundamental component of human psychology. War, on this view, is not merely a political phenomenon but an expression of a deep-seated human capacity for destruction. The attraction to violence, the fascination with death, the willingness to kill and to risk being killed — these are not aberrations but expressions of a persistent dimension of human nature.

Eros (生命驱力) — the life drive — represents the countervailing force: the impulse toward connection, creation, love, and the preservation of life. Hedges argues that the ultimate tragedy of war is not merely the death and destruction it causes but the way it perverts eros, turning the life-affirming impulses of love, solidarity, and purpose into instruments of destruction.

8.2 War and Existential Meaning

One of Hedges’ most provocative claims is that war provides a kind of existential meaning (存在意义) that peacetime often fails to offer. In ordinary life, meaning is elusive. We face the banality of routine, the uncertainty of our purposes, the loneliness of modern individualism. War seems to resolve all of these problems at once: it provides clear purpose, intense community, and the sense that one’s life matters.

But Hedges insists that this meaning is false — a narcotic that masks the reality of what war actually involves. The soldier who feels most alive in combat is experiencing a distortion of authentic experience, not its fulfillment. The community forged in wartime is built on the exclusion and dehumanization of the enemy, not on genuine human solidarity. The purpose that war provides is the purpose of destruction, not creation.

8.3 War Addiction

Hedges draws on his own experience to describe war as an addiction (成瘾). Like any powerful drug, war provides an initial rush of intensity that ordinary life cannot match. Those who experience it — soldiers, journalists, aid workers — often find themselves unable to readjust to peacetime existence. They crave the intensity, the purpose, the camaraderie of the war zone. They feel alienated from the mundane concerns of civilian life.

This addiction has devastating consequences. It drives individuals back into conflict zones, destroys personal relationships, and contributes to the epidemic of post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide among veterans. It also has political consequences: societies addicted to war are unable to commit fully to the difficult, unglamorous work of building peace.

8.4 Finding Meaning Beyond War

The final movement of Hedges’ book is a search for sources of meaning that do not depend on violence. Hedges suggests that authentic meaning can be found in love, compassion, solidarity with the suffering, and the commitment to truth. These sources of meaning are less dramatic than war, less intoxicating, less immediately gratifying. But they are more durable and more humane.

This search for meaning beyond war connects to the broader concerns of peace studies. If war persists partly because it fulfills deep psychological needs for meaning and community, then building peace requires not just political and institutional changes but a transformation of culture and consciousness — the development of alternative sources of meaning, identity, and purpose that do not depend on the existence of an enemy.

Chapter 9: Violence, Power, and Political Change

9.1 Political Realism Revisited

Political realism (政治现实主义) in international relations holds that power — particularly military power — is the fundamental currency of international politics. States exist in a condition of anarchy (无政府状态), with no overarching authority to enforce rules or adjudicate disputes. In this anarchic environment, each state must rely on its own capabilities to ensure its survival. War is therefore a permanent possibility, and military preparedness is a prudential necessity.

The roots of political realism lie in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, in Machiavelli’s The Prince, and in Thomas Hobbes’ analysis of the state of nature (自然状态). Hobbes argued that in the absence of a sovereign authority, human beings exist in a condition of “war of all against all,” where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” This analysis of the domestic state of nature was extended by analogy to international relations: since there is no world sovereign, states exist in a permanent state of potential war.

9.2 Hobbes and Relations Among Sovereigns

Hobbes’ account of “Relations Among Sovereigns” applies his domestic political theory to the international realm. Just as individuals in the state of nature are driven by fear and the desire for security to establish a sovereign authority, states in the international system are driven by the same motives. But whereas individuals can escape the state of nature by establishing a social contract, states cannot, because there is no world sovereign to enforce agreements. The result is a permanent condition of strategic competition, mutual suspicion, and potential war.

The reading by Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisao on realism in international relations theory traces this tradition from classical realism (Morgenthau, Carr) through neorealism (Waltz) to contemporary variants. Classical realists locate the sources of conflict in human nature — specifically, in the lust for power. Neorealists argue that it is the structure of the international system (anarchy), rather than human nature, that drives states toward competition and conflict.

9.3 The League of Nations Debate

The historical readings on the League of Nations debate between H.G. Wells and Henry Cabot Lodge illustrate the tension between idealism and realism in international politics. Wells argued that the horrors of World War I made it imperative to establish an international organization that could prevent future wars. Lodge countered that such an organization would compromise American sovereignty and entangle the United States in conflicts that did not serve its national interests.

This debate prefigures contemporary disputes about the role of international institutions, the responsibility to protect, and the tension between national sovereignty and collective security. Realists remain skeptical of international institutions, arguing that they lack the power to enforce their decisions and that states will always prioritize their own interests over collective commitments.

9.4 Arendt on Violence and Power

Hannah Arendt’s On Violence (1970) offers a distinctive analysis of the relationship between violence (暴力) and power (权力) that challenges both realist and revolutionary assumptions. Arendt argues that violence and power are fundamentally different phenomena, often confused in political theory:

• Power (权力) is the capacity for collective action. It arises when people act together in concert and exists only so long as the group remains united. Power is inherently plural and communicative — it depends on persuasion, agreement, and mutual recognition.
• Violence (暴力) is instrumental — it relies on tools and implements (weapons). Violence can destroy power but can never create it. A regime that rules through violence alone is not powerful but desperate; it has lost the genuine support of its population and must rely on coercion.

Arendt’s analysis has profound implications for the debate between violence and nonviolence as strategies of political change. If power is fundamentally a product of collective action and consent, then violence — which destroys collective bonds — is inherently self-defeating as a political strategy. Nonviolent resistance, by contrast, mobilizes collective power directly. It is therefore not merely a moral preference but a politically more sophisticated strategy.

9.5 Sharp and the Theory of Nonviolent Action

Gene Sharp developed the most comprehensive theory of nonviolent action (非暴力行动) as a method of political struggle. Sharp begins from the insight that all political power ultimately rests on the consent and cooperation of the governed. Even the most authoritarian regime depends on the obedience of soldiers, police, bureaucrats, and citizens. If that obedience is withdrawn, the regime loses its power.

Sharp identified 198 methods of nonviolent action, organized into three categories:

1. Nonviolent protest and persuasion (非暴力抗议与说服): Symbolic acts such as marches, vigils, petitions, and public statements. These methods express opposition and seek to persuade.
2. Noncooperation (不合作): The withdrawal of cooperation from the opponent’s institutions — strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, refusal to pay taxes. These methods aim to undermine the opponent’s power base.
3. Nonviolent intervention (非暴力干预): Active interference with the opponent’s operations — sit-ins, blockades, the creation of alternative institutions. These methods directly challenge the opponent’s control.

9.6 Chenoweth and Stephan: Why Civil Resistance Works

The empirical case for nonviolent resistance received powerful support from the research of Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth. Their landmark 2008 study, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” examined 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006. Their findings were striking:

• Nonviolent campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, compared to only 26% for violent campaigns.
• Nonviolent campaigns were more likely to lead to democratic outcomes.
• Even against brutal, repressive regimes, nonviolent resistance was more effective than violence.

Chenoweth and Stephan identify several mechanisms that explain the superior effectiveness of nonviolent resistance:

• Participation advantage: Nonviolent campaigns attract broader participation because they do not require military skills or physical fitness. Women, elderly people, children, and the disabled can all participate. This larger participation base increases the campaign’s disruptive power and legitimacy.
• Loyalty shifts: Nonviolent resistance is more likely to provoke defections among the opponent’s security forces and supporters. Soldiers and police who are willing to fire on armed insurgents may be unwilling to attack peaceful protesters.
• International support: Nonviolent movements are more likely to attract international sympathy and support, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and media attention.
• Backfire effect: When a regime uses violence against nonviolent protesters, it often backfires — increasing public sympathy for the movement and undermining the regime’s legitimacy.

9.7 Popovic and the Practice of Revolution

Srdja Popovic, a leader of the Serbian student movement Otpor! that helped overthrow Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, provides a practical guide to nonviolent revolution in Blueprint for Revolution. Popovic emphasizes that successful nonviolent movements require careful strategic planning, organizational discipline, and creative tactics. Nonviolence is not passive resistance; it is active struggle that demands courage, intelligence, and imagination.

Popovic’s key principles include:

• Start small: Begin with achievable goals that build confidence and momentum.
• Use humor and creativity: Authoritarian regimes rely on fear. Humor undermines fear and makes the regime look ridiculous rather than terrifying.
• Build broad coalitions: Successful movements bring together diverse constituencies united by shared grievances.
• Plan for the long term: Nonviolent revolution is not an event but a process that requires sustained effort and strategic patience.

9.8 King and the World House

Martin Luther King Jr.’s essay “The World House” provides a fitting culmination to the course’s exploration of violence, nonviolence, and war. King argues that the modern world has become a single household — a “world house” — in which all peoples must learn to live together or perish together. The interconnectedness of the modern world — economic, technological, ecological — means that the problems of war, poverty, and racism cannot be solved in isolation. They require a global ethic of nonviolence (全球非暴力伦理) rooted in the recognition of our common humanity.

King identifies three urgent problems that the world house must address:

1. War and the threat of nuclear annihilation: The development of nuclear weapons has made war an existential threat to humanity. The old justifications for war as an instrument of policy are rendered obsolete by the possibility of total destruction.
2. Racism and racial injustice: The dehumanization of racial others is both a cause and a consequence of violence. Overcoming racism requires a transformation of consciousness as well as political and economic reform.
3. Poverty and economic injustice: Global economic inequality produces suffering on a massive scale and creates conditions conducive to violence and conflict.

9.9 Toward a More Peaceful Future

The course concludes with the question: How can we work for a more peaceful future? The readings and discussions throughout the course suggest several answers:

Understanding the appeal of war: Hedges’ analysis of the myth, seduction, and false meaning of war helps us understand why war persists despite its devastating consequences. Building peace requires addressing the psychological and cultural needs that war exploits — the need for meaning, community, and purpose.

Strengthening moral constraints on war: Just war theory, for all its limitations, provides a framework for holding belligerents accountable to moral standards. Strengthening international law and institutions that embody these standards is an important component of peacebuilding.

Developing nonviolent alternatives: The research of Chenoweth and Stephan, the strategic theory of Gene Sharp, and the practical experience of movements from South Africa to Serbia demonstrate that nonviolent resistance is not a utopian dream but a proven method of political change. Investing in the research, training, and institutional support for nonviolent action is a concrete step toward a more peaceful world.

Building cultures of peace: Tobias Jones argues that peacebuilding is an “artform” — a creative, collaborative practice that cannot be reduced to a set of techniques. It requires patience, empathy, imagination, and a willingness to engage with the complexity of human conflict. Building cultures of peace means transforming education, media, and public discourse to emphasize cooperation, mutual understanding, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Cultivating personal commitment: The course asks students to reflect critically on their own beliefs, values, and assumptions about violence and peace. Personal transformation — the willingness to examine one’s own complicity in cultures of violence and to commit to nonviolent alternatives — is the foundation on which all broader social change rests.